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Abstract 
Between 1991 and 1997 West Germany spent on average about 3.6 bn 
Euro per year on public sector sponsored training programmes for the un-
employed. We base our empirical analysis on a new administrative data 
base that plausibly allows for selectivity correction by microeconometric 
matching methods. We identify the effects of different types of training 
programmes over a horizon of more than seven years. Using bias cor-
rected weighted multiple neighbours matching we find that all pro-
grammes have negative effects in the short run and positive effects over a 
horizon of about four years. However, for substantive training pro-
grammes with duration of about two years gains in employment probabili-
ties of more than 10 % points appear to be sustainable, but come at the 
price of large negative lock-in effects. 
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1 Introduction 
In the 1990s many continental European countries used active labour 
market policies (ALMP) as important tools to reduce Europe's notoriously 
high levels of unemployment, without having to go through the painful si-
de effects of substantial reforms of the labour markets. Training was con-
sidered one of the most important and promising components of this pol-
icy (ILO, 1998). Recent evaluation studies surveyed for example by Fay 
(1996), Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), and Martin and Grubb 
(2001), however, do not appear to develop any consensus whether these 
hopes are justified. 
Germany is no exception to these European trends. Quite to the contrary, 
Germany used training programmes extensively for two different policy 
purposes: In East Germany the goal was to qualify the labour force used 
to work in a centrally planned economy for the demands of a market eco-
nomy. In West Germany, the goals were basically the same as in other 
OECD countries, namely to use training programmes to update and in-
crease the human capital of those workers who drop out of the production 
process and become unemployed. Between 1991 and 1997, West Ger-
many alone spent on average about 3.6 bn Euro per year on such training 
programmes. 
Besides proposing improved versions of standard matching estimators for 
multiple programmes, we provide some answers to the question whether 
individual participants benefit from the fairly long and generous German 
public sector sponsored training (PSST) programmes for the unemployed 
using a microeconometric evaluation approach. We are particularly inter-
ested in the question, that even if there are positive effects of the different 
programmes in the short run (which cannot be taken for granted accord-
ing to the evaluation literature for Germany and other countries), whether 
they can be sustained over a longer period of time. Since the German 
programmes are intensive and long by international standards, data that 
cover considerably more than one or two years after the programme are 
crucial for understanding their differential impacts on variables like indi-
vidual employment. For this endeavour we use a new data base that we 
developed together with a team from the Institute for Employment Re-
search and the University of Mannheim (see Bender et al., 2004) for the 
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sole purpose of enabling the evaluation of German training programmes in 
the 1990s. With the new administrative data we not only can identify dif-
ferent programme types - impossible so far for Germany - but we can 
identify effects of the programmes for seven to eight years as well. Thus, 
we provide estimates for effects that go beyond the usual short-run ef-
fects omnipresent in the applied evaluation literature (for long-run effects 
of a US programme, see Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman, 2000). 
Perhaps surprisingly, so far only little is known about the effectiveness of 
PSST in West Germany, basically because of a lack of appropriate data. 
Most of the previous studies use survey data from the German Socioeco-
nomic Panel (GSOEP)1, e.g. Hujer, Maurer and Wellner (1999b).2 Although 
with this data it is possible to distinguish PSST from other forms of further 
vocational training, there are not enough observations to appropriately 
account for effect heterogeneity with respect to participants and different 
types of PSST.3 On the other hand, even the few studies that use richer 
data (see below) do not exploit this information to analyse the different 
forms of PSST although there is substantial heterogeneity among them. 
Moreover, none of the studies conducted so far have analysed long-term 
effects of PSST beyond three years after the programme. The two studies 
that are closest to our study, in the sense of using data coming from the 
same large administrative data source, are Klose and Bender (2000) and 
Speckesser (2004). 
Based on a less informative previous version of our data base, Klose and 
Bender (2000) analyse the effects of PSST for a cohort of participants 
                                                
1  The GSOEP data is a yearly questionnaire-based survey that started 1984. It provides 
individual data on personal and socioeconomic characteristics as well as retrospective 
information on the employment history and participation in training programmes. It is 
the most widely used data source for empirical analyses of the German labour market. 
2  Hujer and Caliendo (2001) give a survey of studies available for Germany. Below, we 
present only a selection. In particular, we omit the first generation of West German 
evaluation studies, written in German and based on the GSOEP, e.g. Pannenberg 
(1995), Prey (1997, 1999), and Staat (1997). Many more studies are available for  
East Germany, where ALMP are used on a comparatively larger scale. Due to the very 
different labour market situations in East and West Germany, they are not directly re-
levant here.  
3  Small sample sizes may be one reason why some authors (Pannenberg, 1995; Hujer, 
Maurer and Wellner, 1999a, c) using the GSOEP do not distinguish between PSST and 
other forms of further vocational training. 
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ending programmes in 1986. They construct a control group based on eli-
gibility and a hierarchical matching approach. Based on treatment and 
control samples they estimate hazard rate models. They find ambiguous 
results concerning the employment effects of PSST. Speckesser (2004) 
uses the same evaluation period (1993-1994) and the same version of the 
new data base as we do but restricts his analysis to a special type of PSST 
and follows observations only until 1997.4 He constructs a control group 
using propensity score matching and then applies nonparametric regres-
sion based on the predicted propensity scores to estimate differences in 
employment rates up to three years after the beginning of the pro-
gramme. The effects are estimated for six subsamples stratified by unem-
ployment duration before the programme and year of participation, thus 
yielding pretty small sample sizes.5 He finds negative effects for up to one 
year after the beginning of the programme mainly corresponding to the 
time spent in the programme, but no significant effects later.6 
For our study, as for any evaluation study, there is the question of identifi-
cation strategies and estimation methods suitable for the specific situa-
tion. Angrist and Krueger (1999), Heckman and Robb (1986), and Heck-
man, LaLonde and Smith (1999) provide excellent overviews of available 
strategies. Because we argue that in our data we observe many of the 
major variables influencing selection as well as outcomes, we assume that 
labour market outcomes and selection are independent conditional on 
these observables (conditional independence assumption, CIA). For these 
reasons and since our sample is fairly large, we use matching estimators 
accounting for multiple treatments as proposed by Imbens (2000) and 
Lechner (2001, 2002a, b). Two of the advantages of this estimator are 
that it is essentially nonparametric and allows unrestricted effect hetero-
geneity. However, Abadie and Imbens (2004a) show that the usual one-
to-one matching estimators may exhibit an asymptotic bias term. There-
fore, we implement a weighted regression based bias removal procedure 
                                                
4  He evaluates further training of the form we will classify as short or long training in 
Section 3.2 yielding 536 observations in the treatment group. 
5  Sample sizes range from 57 to 121. 
6  The latter is not surprising: a feature of their data is a strongly decreasing number of 
observations after 1995. 
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on-top of the matching. Furthermore, we improve the efficiency of one-to-
one matching by predicting the matched control observation by a weighted 
mean of similar observations. 
This paper is based on unemployed individuals entering training in 1993 
and 1994. The results confirm that all programmes have the expected ne-
gative lock-in effects in the months after they start (e.g. Van Ours, 2004, 
Gerfin and Lechner, 2002). However, in the longer run some training pro-
grammes appear to increase employment rates by more than 10% points. 
Furthermore, we also find that some shorter programmes are effective in 
the short run, but their effects decline as time goes by. This, however, is 
not true for a very intensive full-time programme with a duration of typi-
cally two years, called retraining, which qualifies for a different profession 
than the one currently held. The effects for this type of programme are 
not only large, but they are also sustainable over the complete eight year 
post-programme period we observe. Unfortunately, for this programme 
the lock-in effect is very substantial as well. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: The next section gives the stylised 
facts of the German labour market policies and explains the institutional 
arrangements of the unemployment insurance system. Furthermore, it gi-
ves the details of the active labour market policies, with special attention 
to training. Section 3 discusses data issues, like definitions of programmes 
and the selection of the population as well as the sample. In Section 4, we 
discuss the selection processes into the programmes and provide descrip-
tive statistics as well as estimates of a multivariate probit model to empiri-
cally characterise participants in the different programmes. In Section 5, 
we discuss our identification and estimation strategy. Section 6 contains 
the results for different outcome variables and different groups of partici-
pants, as well as sensitivity analyses. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A 
contains more information on the data. Finally, an appendix that can be 
downloaded from the internet (denoted as 'Internet Appendix' in this text) 
presents additional background information and several details the inter-
ested reader may find useful.7 
                                                
7  www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner/lmw_fuu. 
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2 Labour market policies in Germany 
2.1 The unemployment insurance system and the active 
labour market policy 
In Germany, it is the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) which executes 
the passive and active labour market policy. In the period we are inter-
ested in, the early 1990s, the legal basis for the activities of the FEA is the 
Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, EPA) which regu-
lates the policy measures available to the caseworkers in the labour of-
fices.8 Measures of passive labour market policy include different forms of 
income support during unemployment. Each employee covered by the so-
cial insurance system has to pay contributions to the unemployment in-
surance system (UI). The total UI contribution is shared equally between 
employer and employee. To acquire a legal entitlement to unemployment 
benefits (Arbeitslosengeld, UB) in general, an employee has to contribute 
for at least 360 calendar days within an entitlement qualification period of 
three years before the beginning of the unemployment spell. In addition, 
the potential claimant has to be registered with the labour office, available 
for job placement, willing to participate in ALMP measures, and he has to 
apply formally for UB (§§ 100-104 EPA). 
The minimum duration of UB entitlement is 156 days. The maximum dura-
tion increases with the total duration of insured employment within an ex-
tended entitlement qualification period of seven years, and age.9 Unem-
ployed individuals entitled to UB receive 68 % of their average income in 
the three months prior to the unemployment spell if they have at least 
one dependent child and 63 % without children (§§ 111-115 EPA). Addi-
tional labour income can be earned up to some maximum amount but re-
duces the amount of UB received accordingly (§ 115 EPA). The UB pay-
ment can be suspended for up to eight weeks if the unemployed refuses to 
accept a suitable job offered by the labour office (where suitability is de-
                                                
8 The EPA was enacted in 1969. Since then it was subject to various amendments. On 
January 1st, 1998, the EPA was abolished and replaced by Social Code III. However, 
since this paper analyses public sector sponsored training programmes in 1993-1994, 
we refer to the EPA legislation effective in 1993-1994 everywhere in this paper. The 
legislation relevant for 1993 is taken from BA (1993a), that for 1994 from BA (1995a). 
9 § 106 EPA. For an UE below age 42, the maximum duration is 312 days, above age 54 
it is 832 days. 
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fined by the EPA and the FEA) or to participate in (most) ALMP measures, 
or if he prematurely quits such a measure (this is of course not relevant if 
he finds a job; § 119 EPA). 
Participation in ALMP measures has direct implications for UB entitlement. 
Times in which individuals participate in training and receive income sup-
port from the FEA count in the same way towards future benefits as in-
sured employment does for both the acquisition and the duration of an UB 
claim (§ 107 (1) No. 5d EPA). This implies that participating in public sec-
tor sponsored training can lead to the acquisition of a new UB claim or to 
the prolongation of an existing one. 
Unemployed individuals having exhausted their UB and not yet acquired a 
new claim can receive unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe, UA) if 
they register with the labour office, are available for job placement, are 
willing to participate in ALMP measures, and if they are needy (means test 
for the unemployed and his/her partner). The UA payment amounts to 
58 % of the average income in the three month prior to the unemploy-
ment spell with at least one dependent child and to 56 % otherwise. As 
with UB, additional earnings while receiving UA will reduce the payment 
accordingly. 
According to the EPA, ALMP in Germany aims at achieving and maintaining 
a high level of employment in the economy, as well as at improving the 
employment structure in order to encourage economic growth. In particu-
lar, these measures seek to prevent or reduce unemployment and under-
employment, to improve job-related mobility, to prevent or eliminate ad-
verse effects of structural change in the economy, to improve the labour 
market integration of disadvantaged people, and to eliminate gender dis-
crimination in the labour market. 
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Table 2.1: Expenditure on active and passive labour market policies 1991-1997 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Total expenditure in 
million DM 48912 55125 69286 70619 76816 84795 83673 
 
Shares of total expenditure for active and passive labour  
market policy in % 
Training 13 12 10 9 10 10 8 
Temporary wage subsidy 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
Short time work 1 2 5 2 1 1 1 
Job creation schemes 6 6 4 4 4 4 3 
Early retirement 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
Rehabilitation programmes 7 7 6 5 4 4 4 
Unemployment benefits 33 36 43 47 46 46 47 
Unemployment assistance 14 14 15 18 19 21 23 
Other expenditure 25 23 18 16 15 14 13 
Unemployment rate in % 6.2 6.4 8.0 9.0 9.1 9.9 10.8 
Notes: Expenditures in million DM (approx. 500,000 Euro) for West Germany. Training: further train-
ing, retraining, short programmes according to §41a EPA (abolished at the end of 1992). Tem-
porary wage subsidies are subsidies during the phase of initial skill adaptation in a new job 
(Einarbeitungszuschüsse). Short time work: Kurzarbeit. Job creation schemes (JCS): Arbeits-
beschaffungsmassnahmen. Early retirement: Vorruhestand/ Altersteilzeit/ Altersübergangs-
geld. Unemployment benefits (UB): Arbeitslosengeld. 'Other expenditure' mainly includes 
counselling and job placement services as well as administrative costs of the FEA. 
Sources: BA (1993b, 1995b, 1996-1998). 
Besides counselling and job placement services, the most important in-
struments of German ALMP in the 1990s were training programmes, short 
time work, job creation schemes, early retirement schemes, and rehabili-
tation programmes. Table 2.1 displays the expenditure for different meas-
ures of passive and active labour market policies in West Germany for the 
years 1991-1997. There was first relatively moderate and then rising un-
employment and most of the expenditure was devoted towards UB and 
UA. The structure of expenditures for ALMP was relatively stable. Training 
was by far the most utilised instrument, followed by rehabilitation pro-
grammes. Table 2.2 presents corresponding numbers of participants in 
those ALMP measures that were quantitatively most important in West 
Germany in the years 1991-1997. 
Training programmes - which are the subject of this study - have always 
played an important role in West Germany. They are supposed to adjust 
the skills of an individual to the current and future requirements of the la-
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bour market. Durations range from a few days to three years. The objec-
tives and different types of these training programmes are described in 
more detail below in Section 2.2. In 1991 about 600,000 individuals par-
ticipated in training measures. There was a significant decline in 1993 to 
about 350,000 participants and to 275,000 participants in 1997 due to a 
policy change. 
Table 2.2: Participants in the quantitatively most important ALMP measures 
1991-1997 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Training (total) a) 601 582 350 308 402 378 275 
Further training 
(in % of total) 71 72 76 73 77 77 76 
Short programmes  
(in % of total) 9 8 - - - - - 
Retraining (in % of total) 12 14 21 24 20 20 21 
Temporary wage subsidy 9 5 3 3 3 3 3 
Job creation schemes b) 83 78 51 57 70 70 59 
Short time work b) 145 283 767 275 128 206 133 
Notes: a) Total number of inflows in 1000 persons. b) Yearly average in 1000 persons. Short pro-
grammes are courses according to § 41a EPA (abolished at the end of 1992). Temporary 
wage subsidies are subsidies during the phase of initial skill adaptation in a new job (Einarbei-
tungszuschüsse). Job creation schemes (JCS): Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen. Short time 
work (STW): Kurzarbeit. 
Sources: BA (1993b, 1995b, 1996-1998). 
Short time work (Kurzarbeit, STW) can reduce layoffs due to temporary 
unanticipated reductions in a firm's labour demand. Workers in STW work 
only a few hours per week or month and receive income support to sup-
plement their reduced labour income. With 767,000 participants STW was 
used extensively in 1993 when the recession of the world economy started 
to affect West Germany and, as a result, unemployment increased signifi-
cantly. In contrast, in the other years in the period 1991-1997, the num-
ber of participants did not exceed 285,000. 
Job creation schemes (JCS) provide additional jobs outside the regular la-
bour market which have to be in the interest of the public. Additional 
means that the job would not have been provided otherwise and that it 
does not compete with any job in the regular labour market. In contrast to 
East Germany, JCS only play a minor role in West Germany. The number 
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of participants declined from 83,000 in 1991 to 59,000 in 1997 with a 
temporary increase to 70,000 in 1995/96. Other ALMP measures less im-
portant in West Germany but extensively used in East Germany are early 
retirement schemes which seek to reduce unemployment directly by re-
ducing the labour supply of older individuals.  
Rehabilitation programmes range from different kinds of training to wage 
subsidies, and they are specifically targeted at (re)integrating disabled 
people and individuals with certain kinds of health limitations into the la-
bour market. 
2.2 Training as a part of the active labour market policy 
In Germany, training consists of heterogeneous instruments which differ 
largely in the form and the intensity of the human capital investment as 
well as in their respective duration. Five groups of training programmes 
can be distinguished: (i) short programmes,10 (ii) vocational training,11 (iii) 
further training, (iv) retraining, and (v) German language courses.12 Due 
to data limitations, the subject of this study are further training and re-
training programmes that are now described in more detail: Further train-
ing comprises a variety of different forms of training. The courses offered 
either (a) assess, maintain or improve the occupational knowledge and 
skills of the participant, (b) adjust skills to technological changes, (c) fa-
cilitate a career improvement, or (d) award a first professional degree 
(§§ 41, 43 EPA). The duration of a full-time course that does not award a 
professional degree should in general not exceed one year but it can be 
extended to a total of up to two years if this is deemed appropriate.13  
                                                
10 Short programmes were courses according to §41a EPA which had a maximum dura-
tion of nine weeks and provided information on the services available from the FEA, an 
initial skills assessment as well as basic job search assistance. These measures were 
abolished at the end of 1992. Thus, they are not part of our analysis. 
11 In some special cases the FEA supports regular vocational training in the German ap-
prenticeship system through payment of income support. 
12 Immigrants from Eastern Europe with German origin who participate in such courses 
can receive income support for up to six months from the FEA which also pays for the 
direct programme costs. 
13 § 10 Anordnung des Verwaltungsrates der Bundesanstalt über die individuelle Förde-
rung der beruflichen Fortbildung und Umschulung (A FuU). 
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One form of further training, belonging to category (a) or (b), are courses 
in so-called practice firms which simulate - though under very realistic 
conditions - working in a specific field of profession. There are two forms 
of practice firms which either simulate the commercial part of a company 
(administration, accounting, customer relations, etc.) or the manufactur-
ing part.14 The mean duration of courses in practice firms was seven 
months in 1994, 12 % of participants did spend no more than three 
months in practice firms.15  
Career improvement measures which enable participants to obtain a hig-
her professional degree (e.g. master craftsman, technician or a (below u-
niversity) degree in business administration) had a mean duration of ten 
months in 1994, with 24 % having a duration of more than one year. In 
1994, participants in courses that award a first professional degree spent 
13 months on average in the programme. However, the dropout rate was 
rather high at 19 %. 
Retraining enables working in a different profession than the one currently 
held by qualifying for a new professional degree (§ 47 EPA). A full-time 
retraining measure has to reduce the duration of a regular vocational trai-
ning course in the German apprenticeship system by at least one year.16 
The mean duration in 1994 was 22 months, 20 % of the participants spent 
more than two years in the programme. On average, only about two 
thirds of the participants completed the programme successfully.17  
                                                
14 For the commercial part, there exists a Germany- and Europe-wide network of practice 
firms that trade 'virtual' goods and services with each other to provide realistic condi-
tions for participants who are the practice firm's employees. The skills acquired corre-
spond to what is required for the specific job held within the practice firm, e.g. that of 
an accountant. Courses in practice firms representing the manufacturing part, on the 
other hand, are very heterogeneous ranging from specialist training in technical pro-
fessions over obtaining a driver's licence for special vehicles to just practising bricklay-
ing. 
15 If not stated otherwise, the numbers reported in this section originate from own calcu-
lations based on a sample of participants in public sector sponsored training. For a de-
scription of the data see Section 3.1. 
16 § 10 AFuU. Durations of apprenticeships range from two to three years. 
17 1994: 67.4 %, dropout rate 28.3 %, 4.2 % failed. 
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Table 2.3: Original and target professions of participants in retraining 1994 
(shares in %) 
 Original professions of retraining participants 
Target  
profession None 
Agricul-
ture Mining 
Manu- 
facturing 
Engi-
neering Services Other Total 
No. 
of obs.
Missing 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Agriculture 4 0 14 0 0 3 0 3 16 
Mining 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.2 1 
Manufacturing 31 40 29 34 19 5 0 27 143 
Engineering 3 0 14 6 23 1 0 4 22 
Services 58 60 43 56 58 86 100 62 337 
Other 3 0 0 3 0 5 0 3 18 
% of all observ. 55 2 1 18 5 18 0.4 100 540 
No. of obs. 297 10 7 99 26 99 2 540  
Source: Sample of participants in public sector sponsored retraining (for details about the data, see 
Section 3.1). 
Table 2.3 shows the original and target professions for a sample of re-
training participants in 1994. Almost two thirds of the participants were 
trained towards a profession in the service sector. Data on all retraining 
participants reveal that most of these individuals were trained as office 
workers, or as workers in the social or health services (BA, 1995b). The 
second largest group (more than one fourth) are target professions in the 
manufacturing sector, with most participants trained as locksmiths, me-
chanics, electricians and construction workers (BA, 1995b). One striking 
fact apparent in Table 2.3 is that 55 % of the retraining participants seem 
not to have any formal professional degree before entering the program. 
This fact can be observed not only for 1994. Normally, participation in re-
training requires a first professional degree; otherwise the individual can 
only participate in other forms of training which, for example, award a first 
professional degree. However, it seems that it was common practice to 
refer individuals without any formal professional degree but presumably 
with a substantial record of work experience in a certain field of profession 
to retraining. 
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Participation in further training and retraining can be supported by the FEA 
through payment of a maintenance allowance (MA)18 and by bearing the 
direct costs of the programme such as course fees and study material, as 
well as covering parts of additional expenses for child care, transportation 
and accommodation. In 1994, expenditure of the FEA for further training 
and retraining amounted to 4.2 bn DM for payment of MA plus 2.1 bn DM 
for programme costs (in total about 3.1 bn Euro; BA, 1995b).19 Both full-
time and part-time, and in some very rare cases also distance learning 
courses are supported.20 In addition to pure classroom training a course 
can include on-the-job training (OJT). This is frequently the case in cour-
ses that award a professional degree since OJT is mandatory in the Ger-
man apprenticeship system with only very few exceptions. 
Target groups of further training and retraining are defined by eligibility 
rules. In the period under consideration, FEA support for training was re-
stricted to individuals with a first professional degree or a minimum num-
ber of years of work experience.21 In addition, the potential participant had 
to be either unemployed, directly threatened with unemployment, or with-
out any professional degree. Since FEA support of further training and re-
training measures is funded out of UI contributions, an additional require-
ment was a minimum amount of insured employment (two years) or, al-
ternatively, receipt of UB or UA before entering the programme (§ 46 
EPA). Individuals who did not meet these additional requirements could 
only apply for reimbursement of the costs of the programme.22  
                                                
18 Until 1993 the amount of MA received was 73 % of the previous net income with at 
least one dependent child and 65 % without children. In 1994, the replacement rates 
were reduced to 67 % and 60 %, respectively, which is the same amount as unem-
ployment benefits. 
19 More disaggregated information about the costs of specific programmes is not publicly 
available in Germany. 
20 In 1994 more than 95 % of retraining programmes and courses in practice firms were 
full-time courses. For other forms of further training, the fraction of part-time courses 
ranged from 7-15 %. 
21 Until the end of 1993 the requirement was a formal professional degree plus three 
years of work experience, or no degree but at least six years of work experience. From 
1994 on, the work experience requirement was abolished for individuals with a formal 
professional degree and reduced to three years for all others. 
22 §§ 42, 44-45 EPA. Until the end of 1993 individuals who did not meet these require-
ments had the possibility to apply for MA as a loan. 
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3 Defining the estimation sample and the pro-
grammes 
3.1 The new database 
We use administrative data from three different sources which have been 
made available to the scientific community only recently: the IAB Em-
ployment Subsample (ES), the benefit payment register (BPR), and the 
training participant data (TPD).23 Table 3.1 provides a description of the 
main features of these data sets. The three data sets were merged to ob-
tain an integrated data base that covers not only participant information 
but as well the full history of insured employment and benefit receipt for 
both participants and nonparticipants in public sector sponsored training. 
The merged data base contains information for 208,928 individuals 
(54,756 of whom registered as training participants in the TPD) from 1975 
to 1997. Here, we use supplementary data on the employment history and 
a record of benefit receipt up to the year 2001 for the individuals included 
in the original data sets as well.24 
The outcome of this exercise of making administrative data that were col-
lected for different purposes available to the scientific community is a data 
base that is the most comprehensive one in Germany with respect to 
training conducted prior to 1998. It contains many, if not most, variables 
influencing the selection process into these programmes (see the appendix 
for a list of variables used in our analysis), it allows a fairly precise meas-
urement of interesting outcome variables, particularly those related to in-
dividual employment status, it contains information about different pro-
gramme types and it has a decently large number of observations for the 
major programme groups. Finally, it covers a period of more than 25 
years. 
                                                
23 The common German abbreviations for these data sources are IABS, LED and FuU. A 
detailed description of the ES is provided by Bender et al. (1996) and Bender, Haas 
and Klose (2000). For the TPD see Miquel, Wunsch and Lechner (2002). 
24 Following the abolishment of the EPA and introduction of Social Code III on January 
1st, 1998, data collection and processing has been changed as well. The new data are 
similar to the data formerly included in the IABS and in the LED. See Internet Appen-
dix IA.2 for a comparison of the different definitions of the outcome variables before 
and after this break in data collection. 
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Table 3.1: Combined data sources used  
 ES BPR TPD 
Source Employer supplied man-
datory social insurance 
entries. 
Benefit payment register 
of the FEA 1975-1997. 
Questionnaires filled in by 
the labour officer for statis-
tical purposes (ST35). 
Population 1 % random sample of 
persons covered by social 
insurance for at least one 
day 1975-1997. Self-
employed, civil servants, 
university students are not 
included. 
Recipients of UA, UB, or 
MA, 1975-1997. 
Participants in further train-
ing, retraining, short pro-
grammes (§ 41a EPA), 
German language courses 
and temporary wage subsi-
dies 1975-1997. 
Available 
information 
Personal characteristics 
and history of employ-
ment.  
Information about the 
receipt of benefit pay-
ments, mainly UB, UA, 
MA. 
Personal characteristics of 
participants and information 
about training programmes. 
Important 
variables 
Gender, age, nationality, 
education, profession, 
employment status, in-
dustrial sector, firm size, 
earnings, regional infor-
mation. 
Type and amount of be-
nefits received. 
Type, duration and result of 
the programme, type of 
income support paid during 
participation. 
Structure Spells based on daily 
information. 
Spells based on daily 
information. 
Spells based on monthly 
information. 
Note:  The merged data is based on monthly information. For detailed information on the merging and 
recoding procedures see Bender et al. (2004). The creation of this data base is a result of a 
three year joint project of research groups at the Universities of Mannheim (Bergemann, 
Fitzenberger, Speckesser) and St. Gallen (Lechner, Miquel, Wunsch) as well as the Institute 
for Employment Research of the FEA (Bender). 
Of course, there are several drawbacks as well, four of those could be im-
portant: First, there are several groups of individuals, like nonworking re-
cipients of social assistance, self-employed, and civil servants ("Beamte"), 
who are not paying social insurance contributions and are thus not cov-
ered by these data. Second, employment that is not subject to social se-
curity contributions cannot be observed, and it is impossible to distinguish 
between subsidised employment (like in job creation schemes) and regular 
employment in the first labour market. Third, the training information pri-
or to 1993 does not appear to be complete and correctly coded. Fourth, 
individual information about the unemployed as assessed by the case-
worker (like in Gerfin and Lechner, 2002) is missing. Despite these draw-
backs, given that so far evaluation studies for Germany relied on much 
smaller survey data requiring substantial aggregation across programmes, 
this data base must be considered a very substantial improvement in sev-
eral dimensions, like sample size, selection and outcome information, and 
programme heterogeneity. 
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3.2 Definition of programmes and programme participation 
When aggregating the specific training programme types into groups we 
use the following criteria: homogeneity of subprogrammes with respect to 
selection, to contents and to organisation, sample size, and information 
available to reliably distinguish subprogramme types. Table 3.2 shows the 
resulting five different groups plus a residual category. Because of sample 
size considerations, only the first four groups are subject of this evalua-
tion. 
Table 3.2: Definition of programme types 
Programme Description 
Practice firm Further training that simulates a job in a specific field of profession. 
Short training Further training (i) with the aim of a general adjustment of working skills in 
the profession held; (ii) to obtain an additional qualification in the profession 
held; (iii) to obtain a first professional degree; planed duration ≤ 6 months. 
Long training Same types as short training with a planed duration > 6 months. 
Retraining Training to obtain a new professional degree in a field other than the pro-
fession currently held. 
Career im-
provement 
Further training to obtain a higher professional degree, e.g. master crafts-
man, technician, or a (below university) degree in business administration. 
German language courses: for immigrants from Eastern Europe with Ger-
man origin; participants receive income support during participation. 
Temporary wage subsidies: for individuals with reduced productivity e.g. 
due to long-term unemployment who take up a regular job during the phase 
of initial skill adaptation (Einarbeitungszuschüsse) for usually 6 month, 
sometimes up to 12 months; 30-50 % of the wage. 
Other 
Training while being employed. 
Note:  After selecting the sample of interest, sample sizes for career improvements are too small. 
Other is a residual category that comprises very heterogeneous, small programmes. There-
fore, those two groups are not evaluated. 
The programmes considered here do not only differ with respect to the 
type of training received, but they also differ substantially with respect to 
the planned duration of a programme. Figure 3.1 indicates that typical 
German programmes are much longer than for example Swiss pro-
grammes (see Gerfin and Lechner, 2002). Ignoring other and career im-
provement which are not subject of our analysis, Figure 3.1 shows that 
even short programmes typically have a duration of about five months 
(mean: four), long programmes are clustered at nine or twelve months, 
and retraining has a typical duration of 21 months to two years, with some 
programmes even planned for three years. Thus, these programmes in-
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tend substantial investments in human capital. Although there is a clear 
peak at six months for practice firms, their duration appears to be much 
more heterogeneous than for the other programmes. 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of the planned programme duration 
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Note:  This is the planned duration of a programme determined before the programme starts. 
Next, we define participation in one of the six programme groups. Since 
the programme participation data (TPD) is of good quality only after 1992, 
we consider programme participation between 1993 and 1994. This allows 
us to focus on fairly recent programmes while at the same time still hav-
ing an observation period that allows us to detect long-run effects.25 A 
person is included in our evaluation sample if she starts an unemployment 
spell between 1993 and 1994. The treatment group consists of all persons 
entering a programme between the beginning of the first unemployment 
spell after 1992 and the end of 1994.26 If there are multiple treatments 
                                                
25 Furthermore, since we observe only training spells after the participant left training, 
and some courses have a duration of more than two years, and there is no training in-
formation after 1997, concentrating on the years 1993 and 1994 does not lead to a se-
lective under representation of long training spells. 
26 For a figure showing the start date distribution of this defining UE spell see the 
internet appendix. 
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over time only the first one is included in the analysis if it occurred be-
tween 1993 and 1994. Clearly, the crucial issues here are how we define 
the nonparticipation status and the disregard of second, third, etc. pro-
grammes. 
Taking up the arguments in Fredriksson and Johansson (2003), the fact 
that we condition the nonparticipation status on ending unemployment 
without entering a programme (or not ending unemployment at all) before 
1995 might lead to some bias in our results in favour of the so-defined 
nonparticipation status. This bias should be severe if nearly every unem-
ployed has to participate. However, as will become clear from the descrip-
tive statistics, this is by far not the case. 
The left panel of Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of starting months in 
the two-year window we consider. Partly due to the construction of our 
sample, the probability of treatment increases over time. The right panel 
of Figure 3.2 shows the months it takes until participation after the begin-
ning of the 'defining' unemployment spell (the first UE spell between 1993 
and 1994). With the exception of career improvement, which is not con-
sidered in the evaluation, the start date distribution is pretty homogenous 
across treatments. Nevertheless, retraining appears to be used very early 
in the spell, because about 45 % of the participants start within in the first 
three months. Note however, again, that the combination of our definition 
of 'defining' UE spell beginning 1993 or 1994 and training be observed not 
later than Dec. 1994, clustering in the first two months is rather natural. 
Given our definition of a small treatment window (although in many cases, 
much smaller windows are used in the literature, e.g. Gerfin and Lechner, 
2002), it is particularly important for the interpretation of our results 
which share of the control groups receives treatment as well (similar to 
the problem of substitution bias in an experiment). Furthermore, there is 
the issue of programme careers, i.e. UE participating in more than one 
programme over time. The conceptual problem with analysing the effect of 
e.g. the second participation is that it might be subject to sample selection 
influenced by the effect of the first programme. Thus, such an analysis of 
the effects of sequences of programmes requires a dynamic evaluation 
approach as suggested by Miquel and Lechner (2002), or Lechner (2004), 
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which is not feasible with our data without further aggregation of pro-
gramme types, which is undesirable for obvious reasons. 
Figure 3.2: Monthly distribution of start dates (in %) 
          Month of programme start            Number of months until treatment 
   
 
Note:  The treatments other and career are not considered in the evaluation below. The right panel 
shows the number of months until participation after the beginning of the 'defining' unemploy-
ment spell. 
Table 3.3: Participation in different programme types in % of participants in 
subsamples until 1997 
 Treatment status in study (first treatment) 
Programme participa-
tion between 1993 and 
1997 
Nonpar-
ticipation 
Practice 
firm 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retraining Career im-
provement 
Other 
Practice firm 1.6 3.7 0.9 1.2 0.5 0.9 1.4 
Short training 4.8 4.0 7.3 2.7 1.2 3.6 1.4 
Long training 3.2 4.4 4.7 4.9 1.5 2.7 2.7 
Retraining 1.2 1.5 4.4 1.5 1.0 0.0 1.4 
Career improvement 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 
Other 0.5 0.7 1.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.7 
Total other treatments 
than first treatment 11.4 11.0 11.9 5.5 3.4 7.3 6.8 
Note: Entries show the fraction (%) of members of the subsamples stated in the columns who par-
ticipated at least once in the treatments stated in rows after their first treatment (programme 
participants) or after 1994 (nonparticipants). Due to data restrictions only training spells com-
pleted by the end of 1997 are observable. 
Table 3.3 shows the share of observations defined by the first treatment in 
1993 and 1994, or the absence of it, who participate in additional pro-
grammes. First of all, note that only about 11% of nonparticipants receive 
some sort of training until the end of 1997. A similar share of the shorter 
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programmes, practice firm and short training, shows about the same a-
mount of other programmes, but more than one third of those participants 
in practice firms and two thirds of those in short training who participate 
more than once, participate in a programme belonging to the same pro-
gramme group. For the other programmes, in particular for the longest 
programme retraining, subsequent participations occur only in rare cases 
(3%). To conclude, Table 3.3 provides clear evidence that the effect we 
will estimate are very close to the 'pure' effect of the programme used to 
define the treatment status. 
3.3 Selection of population and sample 
When choosing the appropriate population, we aim at having a homoge-
nous group of people covering the prime age part of the population of 
West Germany. Thus, we do not consider the capital, Berlin, because the 
regional information for Berlin is not precise enough to attribute a particu-
lar individual to the former East German or West German parts of the 
town. Furthermore, we aim to ensure that all people are eligible: We re-
quire that everybody was employed at least once prior to programme par-
ticipation and that they were receiving UB or UA in the month of and be-
fore the programme starts.27 This, however, requires the use of variables 
which are measured relatively to the programme start. We follow one of 
the approaches suggested by Lechner (1999) and simulate start dates for 
nonparticipants by drawing start dates from the empirical distribution for 
                                                
27 'Employed' means that we observe the person at least once in an insured employment 
spell in the ES. With respect to eligibility receipt of UB or UA directly before entering a 
programme is not sufficient. Individuals must also meet the requirement of either hav-
ing a formal professional degree plus three years of work experience (since 1994 zero 
years), or alternatively, at least six years (since 1994 three years) of work experience, 
where times of registered unemployment also count as work experience up to half of 
the required minimum number of years. Since we also require individuals to be em-
ployed at least once before the programme, the only group of non-eligibles we do not 
exclude from the sample are individuals without any professional degree that have not 
(yet) acquired sufficient work experience. Insufficient work experience might also af-
fect eligibility of individuals having a professional degree who have been assigned a 
simulated programme start date in 1993. However, both groups are very small so that 
eligibility is captured sufficiently well by our selection criteria. One might argue that 
we are overly strict in selecting our sample since we disregard short episodes of indi-
viduals not observed in the data which may be due to suspension of UB or UA for up to 
eight weeks. However, the reasons for not being observed in the data are very hetero-
geneous (self-employment, receipt of social assistance, out of labour force, etc.) we 
prefer to exclude these cases altogether. 
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participants and then ensuring that this date does not lie before the be-
ginning of the 'defining' UE spell or after the end of the person's last spell 
that is observed in the data. Nonparticipants that do not satisfy this crite-
rion are excluded from the sample. To avoid most influences coming from 
retirement, early retirement and primary education, we also impose an 
age restriction (20-55 years) before entering the programme. Concentrat-
ing on the main body of the active labour force we furthermore exclude 
trainees, persons in apprenticeships, persons whose last employment was 
less intensive in terms of hours than half of a full-time equivalent, and 
persons who were home workers before the 'defining' UE spell. 
Table 3.4: Sample selection rules 
 Nonpar-
ticipation 
Practice 
firm 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retraining Career 
improv. 
Other
Persons entering unem-
ployment between Jan. '93 
and Dec. '94 
36965 324 644 380 497 130 103 
Simulated programme start after the entry in unemployment (UE) and before the end of the observa-
tion period 
Remaining observations 26022 324 644 380 497 130 103 
Eligibility: Only individuals receiving UB or UA in the month of and before the programme start 
Remaining observations 13091 309 618 350 450 118 92 
Personal characteristics : a) 20 ≤ age ≤ 55; 
 b) no trainees or apprentices;  
 c) at least one observation of employment;  
 d) no home workers; 
 e) no part-time worker less than half of a full-time work 
Final sample 9197 273 572 329 413 110 74 
Note:  All variables are measured before or in the same year as the start of the programme. 
Table 3.4 shows how the sample shrinks imposing these criteria succes-
sively. We end up with a sample of about 9,000 nonparticipants and about 
270 to 570 participants in the four programme groups we consider in the 
econometric analysis. The number of participants in career improvement 
and other is too small to compute a precise treatment effect. 
4 The determinants of programme participation 
4.1 Eligibility, assignment and self-selection into pro-
grammes 
As in every evaluation study, the key to address the sample selection (en-
dogeneity) problem is to obtain an understanding of how different indi-
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viduals end up in different programmes. Instead of postulating a complete 
structural model for the selection process, we discuss the main determi-
nants of selection and then explain which observable variables are used to 
capture them. The determinants can be divided into two groups: those re-
quired by legislation (eligibility), and those that may be underlying the de-
cisions of the caseworker and the unemployed. 
Beginning with the role of the legislation, remember that to become eligi-
ble for FEA support an unemployed must hold a first professional degree 
or have a minimum number of years of work experience.28 In addition, the 
potential participant has to be either unemployed, directly threatened with 
unemployment, or without any professional degree. If not receiving UB or 
UA directly before entering a programme, individuals must be employed 
for at least two years within the three years prior to the programme. As 
discussed in Section 3.3 (in particular in footnote 35) our selected sample 
fulfils the eligibility rules. 
When these conditions are met, then the unemployed could be offered a 
programme by her caseworker. Before going into the details of the deter-
minants underlying the selection decisions of both parties, it is helpful to 
understand the rules of their interaction. The unemployed and her case-
worker meet at least every three months in order to discuss the job 
search efforts of the unemployed since their last meeting, new job offers 
available, potential benefits of participating in labour market programmes, 
as well as potential adaptations of their strategy for getting the unem-
ployed back to work.29 Usually it is the caseworker but it may also be the 
unemployed herself who proposes participation in training to improve her 
chances of finding a job. In any case, the unemployed must apply for FEA 
support before the beginning of the programme, and the caseworker de-
cides whether or not she will receive support. There is no legal entitlement 
to FEA support, and caseworkers have a considerable amount of discretion 
                                                
28 The exact requirement is a formal professional degree plus three (since 1994 zero) 
years of work experience, or no degree but at least six (since 1994 three) years of 
work experience.  
29 The caseworker can schedule a meeting at any time but at least every three months, 
e.g. in order to check the availability of the unemployed for job placement, or to dis-
cuss new job offers or participation in labour market programmes. Attendance is com-
pulsory for the unemployed. See § 132 EPA. 
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in making their decision about programme participation. However, they 
have to use this discretion in accordance with the objectives of the EPA as 
well as the specific aims of the programme (§ 33 EPA). They also have to 
consider the situation and development of the labour market, and they 
have to act based on the principle of economic efficiency. In addition, ca-
seworkers have to take into account the aptitude of the applicant for spe-
cific jobs and her chances for completing a specific programme success-
fully (§ 36 EPA). In particular, the caseworker's decision has to be guided 
by the consideration which of the measures available have the highest 
chances for success and are the least costly, that is, most efficient for a 
specific individual (§ 7 A FuU). 
Usually the caseworker decides in consultation with the potential partici-
pant whether or not and if so what kind of training programme would be 
appropriate based on an assessment of the employment prospects of the 
UE. Since the willingness to participate in labour market programmes is a 
precondition for receipt of UB and UA, UE who refuse to apply or, having 
applied, refuse to participate in a training measure risk suspension of their 
benefits for up to eight weeks.30 
Given our knowledge about the 'average' selection process, the case-
worker's decision about referral of applicants to specific programmes may 
be guided by two objectives: efficiency or equity. Caseworkers pursuing 
efficiency goals assign those individuals to the programmes that are ex-
pected to benefit most from them. In contrast, equity goals require case-
workers to select the neediest individuals into the programmes, where 
neediness is defined by some criterion, e.g. a high risk of becoming long-
term unemployed. The factors relevant for pursuing the latter policy can 
probably be best approximated in our data by the employment and unem-
ployment history (Heckman and Smith, 1999, 2004, point out the impor-
tance of this information in the context of analysing participation in the 
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) in the United States) as well as the 
economic situation of the individual, which are largely determined by the 
last job, educational attainment, nationality and family status since these 
                                                
30 They may even loose their entitlement altogether if benefits have already been sus-
pended before (§ 119 EPA). 
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variables govern chances in the labour market. These factors may also be 
related to the effect maximising strategy. In addition, we would expect 
that participation declines with age, because the amortisation period of the 
human capital investment shrinks. Furthermore, as mentioned for exam-
ple again by Heckman and Smith (1999), the state of the local economy 
may also be a factor influencing the decision of sending somebody into a 
programme or not. The caseworker may, however, be supply constrained 
and not able to offer what he considers best. Yet this is not so important 
here, because it can plausibly be assumed that conditional on all other 
variables like the regional information, this variable is not correlated with 
the outcomes. 
From the point of view of the unemployed, his decision whether or not to 
participate in a programme is guided by considerations very similar to tho-
se of the caseworker. There are, however, additional reasons for joining or 
not joining a programme: If the unemployed sees no chance to find a job 
anyway, with or without a programme, he may prefer not to join a pro-
gramme which reduces his leisure time. Again, we capture this fact by us-
ing his (un)employment history as well as regional variables as a proxy. 
Finally, legislation also provides a rather strong incentive to participate in 
training that is supported by payment of MA: times of receipt of MA can 
extend existing or renew exhausted UB entitlements. To be able to control 
for this fact, we have constructed two variables from the (un-)employment 
histories indicating the UB claim at the beginning and at the end of a spell. 
In our data all the factors determining participation mentioned so far can 
be captured in most cases by very detailed proxy variables, in fact much 
more detailed than usually available in many administrative datasets used 
for evaluation purposes (see Table A.1 in the appendix for details about all 
variables used). However, as already noted in the previous section, in our 
data there is no information about the caseworker's direct assessment of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the UE, for example with respect to his 
motivation and ability. As usual for these variables, we have to rely on 
their indirect effects, i.e. on their effect on the employment and the earn-
ings history that materialised in the past. 
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4.2 The empirical determinants of programme participa-
tion 
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for selected socio-economic variables 
for the different subsamples defined by treatment status. Concentrating 
on the first five groups included in the econometric analysis, the results in 
this table can be summarised as follows: Participants in retraining are on 
average 31 years old, and thus much younger (about five years) than o-
ther unemployed which is completely in line with the idea that substantive 
human capital investments are most beneficial if the productive period of 
the new human capital is fairly long. Another interesting feature is that the 
share of foreigners in the programme is only about half the share of for-
eigners in the group of nonparticipants. Participants in practice firms and 
retraining are less educated and skilled than the rest. The mirror image of 
this observation is that participants in short and long training appear to 
have the best a priori chances on the labour market, although the educa-
tion level of those in short training is somewhat lower than for those in 
long training. Correspondingly, earnings are somewhat higher for partici-
pants in short and more strongly in long training than in practice firms and 
retraining. Earnings of the latter two groups are almost the same as for 
nonparticipants. For the two variables indicating remaining UB claims, Ta-
ble 4.1 does not show much variation, though the average remaining 
claim for participants in retraining is about two months shorter than for 
the other UE. Finally, note that regional and male-female differences are 
fairly small. 
The lower part of Table 4.1 refers to one of the main outcome variables 
used in this study, namely whether an individual is employed in particular 
months before and after the programme. Note that when we go back in 
time, the sample size decreases because more and more young people did 
not yet have their first employment subject to social security contributions 
which is the key requirement to be included in the population from which 
the data is drawn. 
Due to selecting a sample of unemployed before the programme, the rates 
decline when approaching 1993/4, starting with a stable level close to 
70 %. They are low during the programme (retraining has a mean dura-
tion of almost two years) and recover thereafter. None of the groups 
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reaches their initial level in 1990/2 by 2001, although participants in re-
training come close. The rate of recovery for nonparticipants is particularly 
low, already foreshadowing the results of the econometric part below. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of selected variables by treatment status 
(shares in %) 
 Non-
partici-
pation 
Practice 
firm 
Short 
training
Long 
training
Retraining Career 
im-
prove-
ment 
Other
Number of observations 9197 273 572 329 413 110 74 
Personal characteristics 
Women 41 33 37 39 38 24 27 
Age++ * 37 36 35 35 31 32 32 
Nationality:  German 81 87 91 92 89 92 92 
Education: no university en-
trance degree, no professional 
degree 
25 18 15 9 24 5 5 
Polytechnical or university de-
gree 6 0 6 14 3 10 2 
Position in last job 
Salaried employee 28 34 38 57 23 41 39 
Unskilled worker 40 36 31 19 53 9 2 
Last monthly earnings 
Salary in EUR* 1680 1640 1773 1889 1640 2072 1781 
Remaining UB  claim (before entry in the programme) 
Remaining UB claim (months)* 8 7 8 7 5 7 7 
Legal UB claim at the beginning of the last unemployment spell before the programme 
Legal claim* (months) 13 11 12 11 9 10 10 
Programme information 
Planned programme duration* 
(months) 
 6 4 10 20 10 5 
Regional information 
North-Rhine-Westphalia 31 21 28 36 35 23 28 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, 
Saarland 17 23 19 18 17 17 19 
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 30 26 34 21 22 42 38 
UE rate++ ≤ 5 %  1 2 2 0 1 2 4 
5 % < UE rate ≤ 10 %  64 67 70 62 61 72 76 
UE rate > 10 %  35 31 28 38 38 26 20 
Employed in 
January 1990 N =    9559 69.5 68.0 67.0 71.3 66.9 81.4 70.5 
 1992 N =  10609 69.1 67.5 70.0 73.3 68.5 80.6 68.1 
 1993 N =  10870 60.9 55.7 60.5 64.7 57.8 62.7 63.0
 1995 N =  10940 17.8 28.6 29.9 19.8 9.4 32.7 73.0 
 1997 N =  10872 30.1 43.9 49.4 52.6 46.1 60.6 70.3 
 1999 N =  10670 33.6 47.4 49.4 51.2 56.8 56.9 59.5 
 2001 N =  10670 36.3 47.0 52.8 54.9 60.0 61.5 59.5 
Note:  *Numbers marked by an asterisk are means (rather than proportions).  
++Measured in the year of the beginning of the programme. The sample used for the table is 
the one after all selection steps described in Section 3, but before imposing the common sup-
port requirement. For a detailed list of variables see the appendix A.1.  
'N =' means the number of individuals for whom this information is available at that point in 
time. 
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Figure 4.1 provides another look at the monthly employment rate - now 
centred at the actual or simulated beginning of the programmes - and also 
the corresponding numbers for the other outcome variable of interest, 
namely registered unemployment.31 Prior to training, all curves are on a 
fairly similar level, although the employment level of the future retrainees 
is the lowest one for most of the time (and among the highest after the 
programme). Since being unemployed is a precondition for participation, 
the shapes for all subgroups exhibit the usual Ashenfelter's dip (Ashenfel-
ter, 1978) starting about two years prior to the actual or simulated pro-
gramme starts. It must be pointed out that this dip is a purely statistical 
phenomenon coming from the way we selected the sample by enforcing 
the eligibility criterion for participants and nonparticipants. 
Figure 4.1: Employment and unemployment rates by participation status 
         Employment                Unemployment 
 
                Months before and after start of the programme                          Months before and after start of the programme 
     
Note:  Timing relative to observed or simulated starting dates of programmes. Note that after 80 
months the sample size starts to decline rapidly. 
After training, the different rates recover quickly, the speed mainly de-
pending on the average programme duration. The surprising finding is that 
for nonparticipants the recovery of the employment rate suddenly slows 
down about one year after the simulated programme start at a level of 
                                                
31 Note that we define registered unemployment as receipt of UB or UA in the respective 
month. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 3/2005   
 
 
30
about 35 to 40 %. This timing coincides with the end of the benefit period 
for this group, thus suggesting that a large group of nonparticipants 
leaves the labour force after benefit exhaustion. This is reinforced by con-
sidering unemployment for which no large differences are observed after 
the initial programme period is over (note that programme participation 
increases the benefit period), therefore more of the nonworking people 
remain registered as UE thus probably making up the difference in em-
ployment rates. Clearly, combining the fact from Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 
that retrainees are no good a priori risks on the labour market together 
with the observation that their long-run employment rates are among the 
highest, already suggests the likelihood of a positive effect for this pro-
gramme. 
Table 4.2: Differences of mean probabilities for different values of the covari-
ates (in %-points) 
Changes in covariates Nonpartici- 
pation 
Practice firm Short training Long training Retraining 
 mean std. mean std. mean std. mean std. mean std. 
Women - men 1.84 1.25 -1.24 0.85 0.37  0.96 -0.73  0.96 -0.25 0.98
Nationality: 
German - foreigner 
-5.85 1.47 -0.01 0.93 1.97 1.24 0.99 1.32 2.89 1.14
Education: 
Low - high  
3.26 1.24 0.09 0.85 -0.87 0.99 -1.10 1.06 -1.38 0.87
Employment states in 
each of the 5 years 
before 1993:  
unemployment - em-
ployment  
-5.49  8.49 3.57 6.00 2.67  7.43 -6.40  4.50 5.65 8.24
Note:  Probabilities are computed for every individual at each value of the covariates in question given 
the estimated coefficients. Others covariate not explicitly mentioned in the first column are only 
changed if logically required. For example, changing unemployment states change many vari-
ables at the same time (see internet appendix for details). Standard errors of the mean differ-
ences over the sample (which should converge to a normal distribution) are based on 250 
draws from the asymptotic distribution of the estimated MNP coefficients. 
To obtain a better understanding of the empirical selection process and for 
later use in the matching estimator, we estimate a multinomial probit mo-
del for the different treatment states. The Internet Appendix contains all 
details of its implementation and the coefficient results. Here, we only re-
port some simulations based on this model showing the magnitude of 
changes in the impacts that some important exogenous variables have on 
the estimated probabilities. The results for some selected covariate sce-
narios are presented in Table 4.2. They more or less confirm the impres-
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sion from the descriptive statistics. Whereas differences in sex and em-
ployment history are not statistically significant, foreigners are more likely 
to participate, in particular in retraining. Quite surprising a lower education 
makes nonparticipation more likely. 
5 Econometrics 
We base our analysis on the prototypical model of the microeconometric 
evaluation literature with multiple treatments: An individual chooses be-
tween several states, like participation in a specific training programme or 
non-participation in such a programme. Potential participants in the pro-
grammes are assigned hypothetical outcomes for all states. This model is 
based on the binary potential outcome model (Fischer, 1935, Neyman, 
1923, Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974, 1977) extended by Imbens (2000) and 
Lechner (2001) to multiple, mutually exclusive states. Here, we consider 
outcomes of six different states denoted by 0 1 2 3 4 5{ , , , , , }Y Y Y Y Y Y 32. The dif-
ferent states are called treatments in the following to stick to the termi-
nology of that literature. For any individual only one component of 
0 1 2 3 4 5{ , , , , , }Y Y Y Y Y Y  is observable. Participation in a particular treatment m 
is indicated by the realisation of the random variable S, {0,1,2,3, 4,5}S∈ . This 
notation allows us to define average treatment effects for pair-wise com-
parisons of the effects of different states under the usual assumptions 
(see Rubin, 1974; note that we are not interested in the residual cate-
gory): 
γ 0m l m l m lE Y Y EY EY, ( )= − = − ; (1) 
θ 0m l m l m lE Y Y S m E Y S m E Y S m, ( | ) ( | ) ( | )= − = = = − = ;      ; , {0,1, 2,3,4}m l m l≠ ∈ . (2) 
γ 0m l,  denotes the expected (average) effect of treatment m relative to 
treatment l for a participant drawn randomly from the population (average 
treatment effect, ATE).33 ATEs are symmetric (γ 0m l,  = −γ 0l m, ). θ 0m l,  is the ex-
pected effect for an individual randomly drawn from the population of par-
                                                
32 The last state '5' contains career improvement and other and will be ignored in the 
estimation part. 
33 If a variable Z cannot be changed by the effect of the treatment then all what follows 
is also valid in strata of the data defined by different values of Z. 
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ticipants in treatment m only (ATE on the treated, ATET). ATETs are not 
symmetric, if participants in treatments m and l differ in a way that is re-
lated to the distribution of X, and if the treatment effects vary with X. 
5.1 Identification 
ATEs and ATETs are generally not identified so that additional assumptions 
are needed. We already noted that our data compiled from different ad-
ministrative records are so rich that it seems plausible to assume that we 
observe all important factors that jointly influence labour market outcomes 
and the process selecting people into the five different states (selection on 
observables). Therefore, we assume that treatment participation and 
treatment outcome are independent conditional on a set of (observable) 
attributes (conditional independence assumption, CIA). In other words, 
there are no exogenous variables left out that are both correlated with po-
tential outcomes and the participation decision. Expression (3) formalizes 
the CIA on subspace χ  of the attribute space: 
0 1, ,..., | ,mY Y Y S X x x χ= ∀ ∈  (3) 
where   denotes independence. This assumption requires the researcher 
to observe all characteristics that jointly influence the outcomes as well as 
selection into treatments. In addition, CIA requires that all individuals that 
are part of the evaluation could participate in all states (i.e. 
0 ( | )P S m X x< = = , 0,..., 4m∀ = , x χ∀ ∈ ).  
5.2 A matching estimator 
Lechner (2001) shows that the CIA identifies all effects defined in this sec-
tion and that expression (3) implies independence not only conditional on 
X but also conditional on the marginal probabilities of the states (condi-
tional on X), denoted as 0 1 2 3 4[ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )]P X P X P X P X P X .34 Based on this 
insight, Lechner (2001, 2002a, b) proposes and applies different matching 
                                                
34 Depending on the effect to be estimated, we need to condition only on a subset or 
functions of these probabilities. For all details the reader is referred to Lechner (2001). 
All details of the estimation of the conditional probabilities can be found in the internet 
appendix. In addition to the propensity score, one may condition on attributes in-
cluded in it to ensure that a misspecification in the functional form of the marginal 
probabilities has only a minor impact. 
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estimators for that problem. Here, we use an improved version of the es-
timator implemented by Gerfin and Lechner (2002), because it is simple, 
seems to perform reasonably well and appeared to be quite robust in dif-
ferent practical applications (e.g. Larsson, 2003; Gerfin, Lechner and 
Steiger, 2004). Moreover, it was subjected to Monte Carlo studies (e.g. 
Lechner, 2002b) investigating small sample problems and sensitivity is-
sues. The different steps of the estimator are described in Table 5.1. In 
the first step, the multinomial probit model is used to estimate the choice 
probabilities conditional on the attributes. Step 2 ensures that we estimate 
only effects in regions of the attribute space where two observations from 
any two treatments could be observed having similar participation prob-
abilities ('common-support'). Otherwise the estimator will give biased re-
sults (see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998). Note that if we are 
only interested in pair-wise effects the current implementation would be 
unnecessarily strict, since making sure that there is an overlap for each 
pair would be sufficient. Our implementation has the advantage that we 
evaluate all programmes on the same support. In total, the common sup-
port criteria discarded only about 6 % of participants in retraining, 9 % in 
practice firms, 13 % in short training, 19 % in long training, and 24 % in 
nonparticipation. As opposed to the high number for long training, note 
that the high number for nonparticipants is not worrying because they 
have no implication for estimating programme ATETs which are the most 
interesting quantities. Independent of the common support issue, ATE's 
for the nonparticipants cannot be estimated, because the simulation pro-
cedure for start dates already renders a group of nonparticipants not rep-
resentative for the population of nonparticipants. The unemployed we are 
losing for long training are most likely older men with a polytechnical de-
gree and a comparatively high salary in technical occupations (see the 
Internet Appendix for details). 
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Table 5.1: A matching protocol for the estimation of  ,0m lθ  and ,0m lγ  
Step 1 Specify and estimate a multinomial probit model to obtain 
0 1 2 3 4ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )  N N N N NP x P x P x P x P x . 
Step 2 Restrict sample to common support: Delete all observations with probabilities larger 
than the smallest maximum and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples 
defined by S.  
Step 3 Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables. 
For a given value of m and l the following steps are performed:  
a-1) Choose one observation in the subsample defined by participation in m and 
delete it from that pool. 
b-1) Find an observation in the subsample of participants in l that is as close as 
possible to the one chosen in step a-1) in terms of ˆ ˆ( ), ( ),  
m l
N NP x P x x . 'Closeness' 
is based on the Mahalanobis distance. Do not remove that observation, so that 
it can be used again.  
c-1) Repeat a-1) and b-1) until no participant in m is left. 
d-1) Compute the maximum distance (d) obtained for any comparison between 
treated and matched comparison observations. 
a-2) Repeat a-1). 
b-2) Repeat b-1). If possible, find other observations in the subsample of partici-
pants in l that are at least as close as R * d to the one chosen in step a-2) (to 
gain efficiency). Do not remove these observations, so that they can be used 
again. Compute weights for all chosen comparisons observations that are pro-
portional to their distance. Normalise the weights such that they add to one. 
c-2) Repeat a-2) and b-2) until no participant in m is left. 
d-2) For any potential comparison observation, add the weights obtained in a-2) and 
b-2). 
e) Using the weights ( )iw x  obtained in d-2), run a weighted linear regression of 
the outcome variable on the variables used to define the distance (and an in-
tercept).  
f-1) Predict the potential outcome  ( )
l
iy x  of every observation in l and m using the 
coefficients of this regression: ˆ ( )
l
iy x .  
f-2) Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for  ( | )
lE Y S m=  as: 
1
ˆ ˆ1( ) ( ) 1( ) ( )l lN i i i
m m
i
S m y x S l w y x
N N
=
= =
−
. 
g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in d-2), compute a weighted 
mean of the outcome variables in l. Subtract the bias from this estimate. 
h) Compute the treatment effect by subtracting the weighted mean of the out-
comes in the comparison group (l) from the weighted mean in the treatment 
group (m). 
Step 4 Repeat Step 3 for all combinations of m and l. 
Note: Lechner (2001) suggests an estimator of the asymptotic standard errors for ,ˆm lNγ and ,ˆm lNθ  con-
ditional on the weights that we use here. x  includes the date of the beginning of the pro-
gramme, sex, three dummies indicating if the individual is employed 12, 24 and 48 months be-
fore the programme. x  is included to ensure a high match quality with respect to these critical 
variables. R is fixed to 90% in the application. Note that once we estimate all ( | )lE Y S m=  for 
all m, they can be directly used to obtain ( )lE Y . 
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In the matching algorithm implemented by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) the 
same comparison observation may be used repeatedly in forming the 
comparison group (matching with replacement). This modification of the 
'standard' estimator is necessary for the estimator to be applicable at all 
when the number of participants in treatment m is larger than in the com-
parison treatment l. Since the role of m and l could be reversed in this 
framework, this is always the case when the number of participants is not 
equal in all treatments. However, when there are other comparison obser-
vations which are similar to the matched comparison observation, there 
are easy efficiency gains (without paying a too high price in terms of addi-
tional bias) by taking these 'very close' neighbours into account and form-
ing an 'averaged matched comparison' observation. Of course, there are 
many ways to do this in practice (also note the similarity to the idea of 
kernel matching). Here, our basic consideration is that we are not pre-
pared to incur much additional bias, because the variance of the estimator 
is visible after the estimation, and the bias generally is not. To be conser-
vative in this respect, we consider observations which have a distance to 
'their' treated observation of no more than 90 % (called R in Table 5.1) of 
the worst match we obtain by one-to-one matching (after enforcing com-
mon support; R=0 is the case of one-to-one matching; R corresponds to a 
bandwidth choice in kernel weighting).35 To be even more conservative, 
we weight the observations proportionally to their distance from the 
treated (corresponding to a triangular kernel). The results are not too sen-
sitive to the exact way the weighting is implemented. When R is reduced 
the means change little, but the estimated variances increase. 
However, Abadie and Imbens (2004a) show that dependence on the di-
mension of the continuous conditioning variables, the usual one-to-K 
matching estimators where K is a fixed number, may exhibit an asymp-
totic bias, because matches are not exact. Although our weighted match-
ing estimator is smoother and thus probably less subject to this problem, 
we follow their proposal and implement a weighted regression based bias 
removal procedure on top of the matching. The regression is done in the 
comparison sample only. Outcomes are predicted for the attributes ob-
                                                
35 As for the choice of bandwidth of kernel-matching, there are no theoretical results a-
vailable for choosing R (see Imbens, 2004). 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 3/2005   
 
 
36
served in treated and control samples. Specifically, the outcome variable 
is regressed on the propensity score and the additional variables with 
weights coming form the matching step (see Imbens, 2004). The differ-
ence between the mean of the predicted outcomes using the observed X 
of the treated and the weighted X of the comparison observations gives an 
estimate of the bias (see Table 5.1 for the exact implementation). Without 
the theoretical justification given by Abadie and Imbens (2004b), a some-
what similar procedure has been used by in Rubin (1979) and Lechner 
(2000). 
For the sake of brevity we do not document the matching quality explic-
itly, but the weighed matching estimator roughly balances the covariates. 
Detailed results are available in the Internet Appendix. 
We used the same standard errors as Gerfin and Lechner (2002) which 
are conditional on the weights for the comparison observations, because in 
Monte Carlo simulations they showed (e.g. Lechner, 2002b) reasonable 
performance in finite samples (their generalisation to non-integer weights 
as used here is trivial). Unfortunately, alternatives are either not valid, as 
for example the bootstrap (see Abadie and Imbens, 2004b), or have not 
been adapted to the weighted matching estimators with estimated regres-
sors and have unknown operational characteristics in finite samples (like 
the matching-within-the-treated estimators suggested by Abadie and Im-
bens (2004a). 
6 The effects of training 
6.1 Measurement of the outcomes in the labour market 
According to German legislation one of the objectives of active labour 
market policy is to increase reemployment chances and to reduce prob-
abilities of remaining unemployed. Therefore, important outcome variables 
are those relating to the employment status, like registered unemploy-
ment and different types of employment.36 Some types of employment re-
quire a certain quality, approximated for example by the job's duration 
and earnings compared to the previous job. Furthermore, as a crude 
measure for individual productivity gross earnings are considered as well. 
                                                
36 Here 'registered unemployment' denotes all individuals receiving UB or UA. 
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Effects are measured beginning in the month after the programme started 
(with simulated start dates for nonparticipants). Focusing on the beginning 
instead of the end rules out that programmes appear to be successful, just 
because they keep their participants busy by making them stay in the 
programme. We consider a programme to be most successful if everybody 
would leave for 'good' employment immediately after starting participa-
tion. Whenever a person participates in any of the programmes he is con-
sidered as registered unemployed (and not employed). 
6.2 Mean effects of programmes for their participants 
Table 6.1 shows the means of the outcomes in the various groups, the es-
timated counterfactual expectations and pair-wise comparisons between 
the programmes and nonparticipation. We concentrate on the outcome 
employment two and seven years after participation started. 
Columns (3) and (4) give the exact sample sizes (after imposing common 
support) available at each point of (process) time. Note that the small de-
crease in sample size in year seven is due to programme participants who 
could not be observed for all seven years. Therefore, there is loss in preci-
sion which becomes particularly relevant after eight years (to be consid-
ered in the graphs below). 
Columns (5) and (8) show the observed mean outcomes for the partici-
pants in programme m (5) as well as the observed mean outcomes for 
participants in programme l (8). Column (6) shows the estimated mean 
counterfactual outcome of treatment m for population l. Column (7) shows 
the respective estimated mean counterfactual outcome of treatment l for 
population m. Note that over time, employment is generally increasing, 
because the sample is conditioned on being unemployed in month zero. 
The comparison of column (5) to column (6) and of column (8) to column 
(7) reveals the magnitude of the selection bias corrected for by the esti-
mation procedure. It is up to a magnitude of about 9%-points for some 
comparisons. From the direction of the selection correction, we can infer 
whether one group has a priori better or worse chances on the labour 
market than the other. It turns out that participants in short training and 
to a lesser extent in long training have better a priori chances than non-
participants and participants in practice firms. The same holds true for 
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participants in retraining compared to nonparticipants. Note that due to 
sampling error in the estimates, the results do not allow for a complete 
ranking of all populations. 
Table 6.1: Estimated employment effects two and seven years after the begin-
ning of the programme 
Sample size 
Outcome Month after beginning m l 
(
| )
mE Y
S m=
(
| )
mE Y
S l=
(
| )
lE Y
S m=
(
| )
lE Y
S l=
,
0
m lθ  
,
0θ− l m  
,
0γ m l  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Practice Firm (m) compared to nonparticipation (l) 
Employed 24 246 6910 42.3 39.7 38.3 34.2 4.0 5.5 5.4 
 84 242 6772 48.8 51.2 44.5 41.0 4.3 10.2 8.9 
Practice Firm (m) compared to short training (l) 
Employed 24 246 501 42.3 43.5 50.6 54.1 -8.3 -10.6 -9.4 
 84 242 494 48.8 52.0 51.5 54.7 -2.7 -2.7 -1.3 
Practice Firm (m) compared to long training (l) 
Employed 24 246 267 42.3 53.2 44.0 49.4 -1.7 3.8 -10.8 
 84 242 263 48.8 52.3 45.8 54.4 3.0 -2.1 1.0 
Practice Firm (m) compared to retraining (l) 
Employed 24 246 386 42.3 43.3 32.1 35.0 10.2 8.3 9.2 
 84 242 381 48.8 49.0 62.5 62.7 -13.7* -13.7 -11.6 
Short training (m) compared to nonparticipation (l) 
Employed 24 501 6910 54.1 48.5 36.5 34.2 17.6* 14.3* 14.8* 
 84 494 6772 54.7 50.9 46.8 41.0 7.9 9.9* 9.6* 
Short training (m) compared to long training (l) 
Employed 24 501 267 54.1 58.0 50.2 49.4 3.9 8.6 -0.9 
 84 494 263 54.7 52.7 46.4 54.4 8.3 -1.7 2.2 
Short training (m) compared to retraining (l) 
Employed 24 501 386 54.1 53.9 32.5 35.0 21.6* 18.9* 19.0* 
 84 494 381 54.7 53.8 62.5 62.7 -7.8 -8.9 -9.2 
Long training (m) compared to nonparticipation (l) 
Employed 24 267 6910 49.4 52.7 41.1 34.2 8.3 18.5* 16.8* 
 84 263 6772 54.4 48.8 48.6 41.0 5.8 7.8 7.1 
Long training (m) compared to retraining (l) 
Employed 24 267 386 49.4 47.7 29.8 35.0 19.6* 12.7 21.6* 
 84 263 381 54.4 52.5 64.2 62.7 -9.8 -10.2 -12.1 
Retraining (m) compared to nonparticipation (l) 
Employed 24 386 6910 35.0 30.4 43.2 34.2 -8.2 -3.8 -4.3 
 84 381 6772 62.7 61.1 47.0 41.0 15.7* 20.1* 19.3* 
Note: Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, numbers in italics relate to the 10 % level 
and * to the 1 % level. 
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The estimates of the mean effects of treatment m compared to treatment l 
for the subpopulation observed in the respective state can be computed 
directly from columns (5) to (8) and are reported in columns (9) to (10) 
together with an indicator of their asymptotic significance. Column (9) 
show the mean effect for participants in treatment m (difference between 
column (5) and (7)), while column (10) displays the results for partici-
pants in treatment l (difference between column (6) and (8)). Column 
(11) shows the effects for the joint population of participants and the non-
participants. Since it also considers populations other than m and l, it can 
be larger or smaller than the mean effects for the populations m and l. 
The results in columns (9) to (11) show that in the long and short run al-
most all programmes have positive effects compared to nonparticipation, 
although not always significant. The exception is retraining due to a lock-
in effect which is most severe for this particularly long programme. In 
contrast to retraining, long and short training have short-run employment 
effects in the range of 8-18 %, falling to about 6-8 % after seven years 
(not significant for long training).  
The pattern for retraining is quite different. After a negative lock-in effect, 
the employment effect rises to almost 16 % after seven years suggesting 
a substantial and sustainable impact of this expensive programme. In the 
long run, retraining dominates practice firms, but although it seems to 
have larger effects compared to short and long training, the latter are only 
significant at the 10 % level. Among the programmes, the effects for prac-
tice firms appear to be hardest to pin down. Finally, note that the com-
parison between short and long training reveals hardly any positive re-
turns of the additional investment in time and money required for long 
training. In fact, the results are quite positive for a 'short' programme with 
a maximum duration of six months and a much lower average duration, 
although due to lacking cost data, other than very rudimentary cost-
benefit considerations are impossible. 
Finally, Table 6.1 is informative about the question whether, on average, 
caseworkers send those types of unemployed into the specific pro-
grammes that can expect the highest return from it. If this presumption is 
true, the effect must be larger for the respective participants (ATET) than 
for the participants in other programmes and nonparticipants (ATE). Even 
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without exact standard errors for this test, it is obvious that, if there is 
evidence at all, it suggests that caseworkers do not send those unem-
ployed into the programme for which the highest return is expected. 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 display the estimates of the effects of the different 
programmes (compared to the other states) for participants in the respec-
tive programme (ATET) for the two different outcome variables. A line 
above zero indicates that the programme has a positive effect relative to 
the programme (or nonparticipation) associated with that particular line. 
In other words, a line above zero is good news for the programme appear-
ing in the header of the respective graph and bad news for the one associ-
ated with the particular line. Only effects significant at the 5 % level are 
displayed. 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that all programmes have some negative 
lock-in effect due to reduced job search or received job offers during par-
ticipation in the programme. The length of this negative effect is very 
much tied to programme duration, being about two to three years for re-
training, six months to one year for long training, three to six months for 
short training and practice firms.  
After the lock-in effect, the reemployment chances for participants in prac-
tice firms are somewhat better than how they would have been in case of 
nonparticipation, but the effects are only mildly significant and appear not 
to be sustainable. Participating in retraining would have been superior in 
terms of employment chances. 
After about three years there are substantial positive employment effects 
(Figure 6.1) of retraining for its participants compared to nonparticipation 
and the other types of training. A positive effect of similar size appears for 
short training compared to nonparticipation although it starts much earlier 
(nine months) and seems to decline slowly over time. The positive effect 
for long training compared to nonparticipation begins even later (18 
months) and is not very incisive after about four years.  
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Figure 6.1: Dynamics of the effects ( ˆmltθ ): Employment differences in %-points 
  
  
  Months after start of the programme                             Months after start of the programme 
             
Note:  Only effects that are significant at the 5% level (point wise) appear in the figures. Sample size 
declines quickly after 7 years (84 months). 
To check whether jobs are (somewhat) stable, we use an outcome vari-
able which requires at least seven months of continuous employment (six 
months is the usual probation period in Germany, within that period ter-
mination of a job is very easy for both sides). We obtained comparable 
results. In a similar vain we coded somebody as employed only if the per-
son received at least 90% of the earnings of his last job prior to training. 
It does not change the conclusions (detailed results are available in the 
Internet Appendix). 
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Figure 6.2: Dynamics of the effects ( ˆmltθ ): Unemployment (difference in  
%-points) 
  
  
 Months after start of the programme                             Months after start of the programme 
       
Note:  See note below Figure 6.1.  
It is likely that a substantive programme like retraining may not only af-
fect the employment probability, but the productivity of the new job as 
well. For the latter, earnings are a convenient summary measure. How-
ever, the earnings differences (zero earnings if not employed) are very 
much driven by the employment dynamics and hence, it is not surprising 
that they confirm the previous results: In year seven there is a gain in 
monthly earnings from retraining compared to nonparticipation of about 
400 to 500 Euros (see Internet Appendix for details). The gains from short 
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and long training compared to nonparticipation are positive as well, but 
about 250 Euros lower than for retraining. 
At least from the point of view of the unemployment insurance system, 
considering the outcome variable registered unemployment is relevant 
(Figure 6.2). We find that none of the programmes dominates nonpartici-
pation systematically, probably because programme participation in-
creases the maximum unemployment benefit entitlement period, so that 
non-workers have an incentive of remaining registered. Thus, the major 
effect of the programmes compared to nonparticipation is that they bring 
those unemployed back to work that would otherwise leave the labour 
force. For inter-programme comparisons, Figure 6.2 by and large confirms 
the previous findings. 
The previous figures showed that there are indirect costs of the pro-
grammes in terms of the initial negative effects most likely due to lock-in, 
i.e. a reduced job finding probability during programme participation. A 
first step of a cost benefit analysis is to compare the initial negative effects 
to the positive effects that may occur later. To do so, we accumulate the 
effects over time, starting with the first month of the programme. Figures 
6.3 and 6.4 shows the respective total effects at any point in time during 
the seven year interval for which we have reliable data. Not surprisingly, 
the effects appear in a somewhat different light. 
Considering employment first, Figure 6.3 shows that short training is now 
clearly the most attractive programme. Short programmes have by defini-
tion only a small lock-in effect, and thus their positive effect accumulates 
much longer, suggesting a gain of about seven to eight months of em-
ployment over the seven to eight years following programme start com-
pared to nonparticipation and a corresponding gain of about four months 
compared to retraining. A similar shape shows up for long training com-
pared to nonparticipation, but the level of the effects is somewhat differ-
ent. There appear to be some positive accumulated effects for practice 
firms compared to nonparticipation as well, but they fade out after six 
years. For retraining, eight years are not sufficient to recover fully from 
the initial lock-in effect and to create an overall significantly positive effect 
(compared to all programmes and nonparticipation). Assuming a continu-
ing trend, it seems likely that positive effects appear after ten years, but 
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of course this projection remains a speculation. Nevertheless, after seven 
to eight years for participants in retraining it is impossible to conclude 
which of the available training schemes would be overall most effective for 
them. 
Figure 6.3: Accumulated employment effects (
1
ˆ ˆ
t
ml ml
t τ
τ
θ θ
=
= ) in months 
  
  
 Months after start of the programme                             Months after start of the programme 
  
Note:  See note below Figure 6.1. Read entry for ˆml
tθ   as: "On average for participants in m, t months 
after beginning participation in m, it increased the total time in employment compared to l for by 
ˆml
tθ  months." 
Figure 6.4 shows that the shapes of accumulated earnings and employ-
ment effects are fairly similar. After about seven to eight years, the accu-
mulated earnings gains (not discounted) in short training are very similar 
to those in retraining and long training. Compared to nonparticipation the 
break even point (passing the zero line from negative to positive) for short 
training occurs in month eight, for long training in month 23, and for re-
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training in month 69. The accumulated effect for practice firms becomes 
positive after month 15, but is always insignificant. 
Figure 6.4: Accumulated effects (
1
ˆ
t
ml
τ
τ
θ
=
 ): Monthly earnings differences in 
10.000 EUR 
  
  
Months after start of the programme                                   Months after start of the programme 
 
Note:  See notes below Figure 6.1 and 6.3. 
6.3 Heterogeneity by types of unemployed 
Now, we investigate whether groups defined by different exogenous socio-
economic characteristics exhibit different effects by stratifying the sample 
along the dimensions unemployment duration, regional unemployment 
rate, type of occupation and education and match within the strata.  
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Table 6.2: Effect heterogeneity (employment) seven years after the beginning of the programme (difference in %-points) (
,
0
m lθ ) 
 Regional  UE-rate Big town Sex Long-term UE Type of occupation Education 
m - l 
≤10% >10% <100,000 
inhabit. 
≥100,000 
inhabit. 
Men Women < 12 
months 
≥ 12 
months 
Un-
skilled 
Skilled 
(incl. 
master 
crafts-
man) 
Salaried Without 
profess. 
degree  
With 
profess. 
degree 
Practice firm - nonparticipa-
tion 9.1 -4.3 6.3 -1.1 -1.3 22.8* 9.0 -0.6 -3.3 2.4 9.5  4.1 
Practice firm - short training -3.1 7.6 -5.0 -8.9 -6.1 -2.9 -1.5 -9.4 -2.8 -14.7 -8.5  -1.9 
Practice firm - long training 4.0 0.8 0.2 2.3 -2.6 12.5 4.8 2.7 -4.0  -2.4  -0.9 
Practice firm - retraining -13.2 -4.6 -9.9 -7.9 -21.1* -11.2 -15.8 0.1 -7.2  -17.2  -14.4 
Short training - nonparticipa-
tion 14.6* -6.8 15.6* -0.4 11.8* 10.9* 13.3* -4.0 -3.5 12.0 11.2 5.3 5.4 
Short training - practice firm 0.3 4.5 4.1 0.1 13.6 -16.0 -5.0 4.1 4.7 20.8 -0.9  2.8 
Short training - long training 14.2 -6.0 6.3 10.1 15.7 2.0 4.4 8.0 0.0  2.0  13.2 
Short training - retraining -8.1 -11.8 -0.7 -13.9 -3.6 -13.4 -12.7 5.1 -12.1  -20.8 -8.1 -9.0 
Long training - nonparticipa-
tion 5.7 3.8 19.0* -7.8 6.1 9.4 10.6 -3.3 -5.1  10.1  4.0 
Long training - practice firm -6.4 31.5* -4.9 3.4 10.7 -17.0 -3.9 6.2 1.0  -3.5  1.1 
Long training - short training -6.0 13.4 -2.4 -0.6 -2.9 -0.3 -0.7 4.2 -1.0  -5.6  -0.6 
Long training - retraining -11.0 -14.7 -2.4 -28.9* -12.3 -19.9 -16.7* 11.4 -10.2  -23.4  -12.6 
Retraining - nonparticipation 15.5* 6.8 15.6* 13.0 12.6* 15.2* 18.6* 3.7 9.8  12.9 17.4* 12.0* 
Retraining - practice firm 2.5 25.8 6.9 -0.2 17.5 -1.8 3.3 16.7 23.9*  2.9  20.5* 
Retraining - short training 9.2 4.4 6.3 16.7 3.9 8.2 7.3 6.3 12.3  3.9 0.1 8.7 
Retraining - long training 10.2 9.4 5.0 27.5* 12.3 14.9 8.4 9.6 11.3  13.7  16.6 
Sample size 
Nonparticipation 4245 1641 3177 2179 3597 2119 4082 1736 2184 1001 1097 1119 4835 
Practice firm 163 67 137 82 159 73 140 84 82 52 73 40 193 
Short training 348 110 277 161 285 141 301 160 137 92 141 58 405 
Long training 165 74 147 90 127 96 161 85 52 32 107 26 225 
Retraining 234 122 244 106 224 112 247 113 186 46 54 89 269 
Note:  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, numbers in italics relate to the 10% level and * to the 1% level. Comparisons based on less than 
50 observations are not reported in the table. Cells shaded in grey indicate that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 6.2 displays the results. The number of observations given in the 
lower part of this table indicates that in many cases the subsample esti-
mates will be too imprecise to uncover significant differences.37 Despite 
the problems of precision, some conclusions can be derived from this ta-
ble. Compared to nonparticipation, all programmes are more effective in 
regions without serious unemployment problems and for short term un-
employed (less than one year). The most significant male-female differ-
ences appear with respect to practice firms, which are ineffective for men, 
but highly effective for women. An explanation could be that the types of 
practice firms men and women mainly attend are different (men: mainly 
manufacturing; women: mainly commercial), so that we measure different 
effectiveness for the two types of programmes instead of a male-female 
difference. Finally, the results concerning education levels and type of oc-
cupation confirm the impression that effect heterogeneity does not appear 
to be present on a massive scale. 
6.4 Sensitivity analysis 
We performed several sensitivity tests to check whether choices about im-
plementational issues are relevant for the results we obtain. For sake of 
brevity, we summarise the results and refer the interested reader to the 
Internet Appendix for any details. 
First, the common support criterion is made stricter by defining the upper 
and lower bounds as 10th largest and smallest observation instead of the 
minimum or maximum, leading to a better match in the tails of the pro-
pensity score distribution. In addition to the condition used before, an-
other 40 % of nonparticipants are deleted. The corresponding numbers for 
practice firms are 12 %, short training 36 %, long training 30 % and re-
training 35 %. Due to the smaller number of observations some effects 
are no longer significant, but the conclusions do not change. 
                                                
37 We use the MNP estimate from the joint model, but the remaining steps of the estima-
tion are performed in the subsamples. Therefore, the observations do not add up to 
the number of the observations in the full sample, because the common support crite-
rion must delete more observations if used in subsamples separately (a table with de-
tailed numbers is available in the internet appendix). 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 3/2005   
 
 
48
Second, the additional matching variables other than sex used to define 
the distance metric in the matching algorithm are not used. Again, the re-
sults are qualitatively the same, but in particular for retraining, the effects 
are somewhat smaller and fewer of them are significant.  
Third, since the effects for men and women based on the common estima-
tion of the MNP model showed considerable effect heterogeneity, it might 
be suspected that more flexibility is required when estimating the decision 
to participate in a programme. Therefore, we estimate MNP's for men and 
women separately but do not find significant differences in the effects 
compared to the case with a common MNP model. 
The next check concerned the question to smooth (and thus increase pre-
cision) the estimated effects by computing three month moving averages 
of the respective outcome variables. Not surprisingly, the results are a bit 
'smoother', but the efficiency gains appear to be very small. 
Fifth, for a selected outcome variable, namely accumulated employment, 
in the Internet Appendix we report the results for simple one-to-one 
matching as in Gerfin and Lechner (2002). The main change is that sev-
eral positive effects for practice firms compared to nonparticipation are 
estimated more noisily and could not be detected with one-to-one match-
ing. 
Finally, the Internet Appendix reports in detail the estimated asymptotic 
bias of the weighted matching estimator used here (all results are ad-
justed for this bias). A large and volatile value of it would clearly raise 
concerns about the adjustment procedure. This is not the case, however, 
compared to the magnitude of the effects. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper presents evaluation results for different forms of West German 
public sector sponsored training programmes of the mid 1990s. The em-
pirical analysis is based on a new administrative data base constructed for 
evaluation purposes that supports selectivity correction by microecono-
metric matching methods as well as the identification of effects over a ho-
rizon of more than seven years. We find that all programmes have nega-
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tive effects in the short run and most of them positive effects over a hori-
zon of about four years. 
However, the results for the various programmes differ quit substantially 
when considering our key outcome variable, employment, seven years af-
ter programme start, which is the longest horizon for which we have reli-
able outcome information. Retraining, involving the most substantial in-
vestment in human capital dominates all other programmes as well as the 
state of nonparticipation. The gain in employment probability over nonpar-
ticipation is about 10-15 %-points. This does not only hold for participants 
in retraining, but also for participants in other programmes had they par-
ticipated in retraining. Short and long training dominate nonparticipation 
with a somewhat smaller gain of about 5-9 % after seven years. Positive 
effects for practice firms, if any, appear to be too small to be detectible 
with our sample sizes.  
Focussing on the overall performance over the seven year period, i.e. net-
ting out positive and negative effects over time, the findings change 
somewhat, because the different programmes have very different lock-in 
effects that are directly related to their duration. In this comparison, 
shorter programmes (below six months) outperform the rest. Compared to 
nonparticipation, the gain after seven years would be about eight months 
of additional employment. It is about half for longer training courses other 
than retraining. For retraining, the initial lock-in effects are so large that a 
period of seven years is too short to allow significant positive effects to be 
detected, although there is a clear trend towards positive overall effects. 
Finally, no sustainable positive effects are visible for practice firms. Com-
pared to nonparticipation even after seven years, all programmes increase 
the duration of benefit receipt. The increase due to retraining is about 10 
months, for short training it is a few days, for long training 3 months and 
practice firms increase benefit receipt by about 4 months. These numbers 
point again to the fact that the positive and sustainable employment and 
earnings effects of retraining come at a considerable cost. 
Our findings help to understand a puzzle that occurred in the previous lit-
erature, namely that for most training programmes significantly positive 
effects cannot be found. It may be a needle in a haystack problem, i.e. if 
we believe the kind of consensus of the education literature that returns in 
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earnings of one year of full-time schooling are between five and ten per-
cent, then it would be surprising if programmes for unemployed with a du-
ration of a few months or much less can have effects large enough to be 
detectible by noisy data, even if the samples are large. Yet, even the 
group of 'shorter' German programmes are fairly long by international 
comparisons, and particularly retraining involves rather significant human 
capital investments that can be expected to be above the ‘noise-threshold’ 
level, and are thus detectible in our study. 
When trying to relate our finding of positive long-run effects of the long-
term retraining programme to the literature, we discovered that there are 
very few evaluation studies for these types of programmes. Part of the 
explanation for this is that only very few OECD countries use long pro-
grammes in ALMP, and even if those programmes are evaluated, these 
studies are either not using an implicit or explicit control group design or 
long-term outcomes are not available. An exception is the paper by Win-
ter-Ebmer (2003) who investigates a special programme used to assist 
the restructuring of the Austrian steel industry. There was a substantial 
human capital enhancing component in this programme for which he finds 
positive effects five years after leaving the programme. 
To conclude, the literature developed the consensus that it is most impor-
tant for evaluation studies to obtain large and highly informative data to 
control for selective participation in different programmes. In this paper, 
we acknowledge this fact and use a large and informative database, but 
we also point out that successfully controlling for selection effects does not 
imply that we are estimating an interesting policy parameter. If we want 
to understand the differential effects of training programmes that substan-
tially differ with respect to their human capital augmenting nature, data 
that cover more than two to three years after the programme are crucial. 
However, there is a price to pay, namely that the programmes under con-
sideration have to be implemented at least about ten years before the 
study is conducted. Typically, politicians are fairly impatient and econo-
metricians tend to deliver the information that the policy makers request. 
Recent studies based on large and informative administrative data which 
were induced by the respective governments, like Gerfin and Lechner 
(2002) for Switzerland or Sianesi (2004) for Sweden, are interesting for 
understanding the immediate effects of short programmes that are not 
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expected to change the long-term prospects of the unemployed by adding 
substantial human capital. The reason is that their only long-term effect is 
indirect by bringing participants into employment more or less immedi-
ately after the programme. Thus, short-term employment effects might be 
informative about long-term employment effects. If an active labour mar-
ket policy consists basically of these short programmes, like the Swiss 
one, or the Swedish components Sianesi (2004) looked at, then this ap-
proach is valuable. However, for the long German programmes with the 
clear intention of substantial human capital addition, short-term effects 
can rarely be positive because the lock-in effect is much more important. 
Therefore, observing the outcomes over a longer time horizon, e.g. seven 
to eight years like in this paper, is crucial to obtain some understanding of 
the overall effects of these programmes. As an interesting by-product we 
obtain information whether the short-term effects of the short pro-
grammes are good predictors of their long-term effects. 
Future work will create a data base containing, in particular, caseworker 
information which is missing from the current data version. However, due 
to the administrative data collection process this new evaluation will only 
be possible for programmes having started after 2000. Therefore, we ex-
pect to report new long-term effects of German training programmes 
based on an improved selection correction not before 2010. Until then, the 
information provided in this paper is probably our best guess about long-
term effectiveness of training programmes that substantially improve hu-
man capital. 
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Appendix A: Data 
Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics 
 Nonpar-
ticipa-
tion 
Practice 
firm 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retraining Career 
improve-
ment 
Other 
Number of observations 9197 273 572 329 413 110 74 
Proportions in % 
Personal characteristics 
Women 41 33 37 39 38 24 27 
Older than 50 years 15 7 6 5 1 3 1 
Younger than 26 years  14 19 15 15 21 21 22 
Age* 37 36 35 35 31 32 32 
Nationality:  German 81 87 91 92 89 92 92 
 Western European 12 7 6 5 7 3 5 
 Eastern European 4 3 2 1 2 3 1 
 Other  3 3 1 3 2 3 1 
Marital status: Single 48 60 58 59 62 64 53 
 Married 52 40 42 41 38 36 47 
Children: No child 62 73 64 65 61 72 58 
 At least one child 38 27 36 35 39 28 42 
Education 
No university entrance degree, 
no professional degree (PD) 25 18 15 9 24 5 5 
No university entrance degree, 
with PD 65 78 75 71 68 80 81 
University entrance degree, no 
PD 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
University entrance degree 
and PD 3 2 3 5 3 5 8 
Polytechnical degree 2 0 3 5 1 5 1 
University degree 4 0 3 9 2 5 1 
Position in last job 
Salaried employee 28 34 38 57 23 41 39 
Part-time worker 10 5 8 7 8 4 4 
Master craftsman 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Unskilled worker 40 36 31 19 53 9 2 
Skilled worker 21 23 23 16 16 45 35 
Industrial sector 
Construction 8 5 6 5 5 14 9 
Commerce 16 16 20 16 12 12 15 
Banking, insurance 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 
Local, regional authorities, 
social insurance 4 5 5 7 6 4 1 
Non-profit organisations,  
private households 3 3 2 3 4 3 0 
Argiculture, forestry, fishing 1 3 1 1 1 0 0 
Energy and supply industry, 
mining 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Manufacturing (without con-
struction) 38 40 38 38 41 48 49 
Transportation, telecommuni-
cations 5 4 5 4 7 3 7 
Other services 23 20 21 22 22 15 16 
Table A.1 to be continued  
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Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics (continued-1) 
 Nonpar-
ticipa-
tion 
Practice 
firm 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retraining Career 
improve-
ment 
Other 
Last monthly earnings 
Salary in Euros* 1680 1640 1773 1889 1640 2072 1781 
No information++ 11 3 4 4 3 5 3 
Regional information 
Big city (at least 300,000  
inhabitants) 26 18 24 29 20 26 7 
North (Hamburg, Bremen, 
Schlesw.-H.) 22 30 19 25 26 18 15 
North-Rhine-Westphalia 31 21 28 36 35 23 28 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, 
Saarl. 17 23 19 18 17 17 19 
Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria 30 26 34 21 22 42 38 
Local UE rate ≤ 5 % ** 1 2 2 0 1 2 4 
Local 5 % < UE rate ≤ 10 % ** 64 67 70 62 61 72 76 
Local UE rate > 10 %  ** 35 31 28 38 38 26 20 
Last occupation in/as 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 2 2 2 3 3 0 0 
Plumbing, metal construction  
technology 9 15 11 7 9 19 7 
Food and nutrition 4 2 4 1 4 2 4 
Construction, woodworking 10 8 8 5 9 15 15 
Merchant (goods and ser-
vices) 9 12 12 9 6 5 7 
Transportation, storage 13 12 14 9 15 3 15 
Administration, office work,  
business, social scienc. 14 22 22 31 13 17 16 
Health services 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 
Hairdressing,guest assist., 
housekeeping, cleaning 8 6 3 2 7 3 1 
Chemical worker, polymer 
processing 3 1 1 2 6 1 0 
Unskilled worker 2 4 2 1 2 0 1 
Metal production and process-
ing 4 5 4 2 6 2 8 
Textile, leather, clothing 3 1 1 2 2 0 1 
Security services 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 
Paper manufacture and proc-
essing, printing 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 
Social services, education,  
counselling 3 0 0 2 4 2 1 
Media, humanities, arts 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Mining 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Technology, natural sciences 4 1 6 16 2 15 14 
Machinist 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Electronics 4 2 3 4 4 7 4 
Stone, ceramics, glass making 
and/or processing  1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Table A.1 to be continued  
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Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics (continued-2) 
 Nonpar-
ticipa-
tion 
Practice 
firm 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retraining Career 
improve-
ment 
Other 
Remaining unemployment (UE) benefits claim at the end of the last unemployment spell  
before entry in the programme 
Remaining UE benefits claim  
(in months)* 8.1 7.4 7.8 7.2 5.8 6.8 6.5 
No information or no claim  44 48 44 42 38 27 31 
Legal UE benefits claim at the beginning of the last unemployment spell before the programme 
Legal claim* (months) 12.6 11.0 11.5 10.6 9.3 10.1 9.6 
No information  26 29 28 24 25 17 20 
No claim 4 5 3 4 3 3 3 
Unemployment benefits or assistance in the month before the beginning of the programme 
UE benefits 73 71 72 76 75 83 80 
UE assistance 27 29 28 24 25 17 20 
Various historical un/ out-of/employment  information before the "first unemployment period" 
Months of last employment 
spell* 50 44 51 49 40 48 45 
Proportion of employment 
months (in %)* 72 70 72 72 70 80 75 
Proportion of out-of-labour 
months (in %)* 13 12 13 13 16 11 10 
Proportion of UE months 
(in %)*  11 12 10 9 9.03 43 8 
# of programs up to 2 years 
before the UE period (UEP)* 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.08 
# of programs  up to 5 years 
before the UEP* 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.19 0.22 
# of programs from entry in 
the data up to UEP* 0.28 0.45 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.25 0.41 
Mean duration of UE spells  
     up to 2 years before UEP* 1.48 1.74 1.30 1.19 1.23 0.69 0.87 
     up to 5 years before UEP* 2.77 3.05 2.31 2.03 2.30 1.16 1.77 
     from entry in data to UEP* 3.95 4.09 3.5 3.3 2.95 2.13 3.04 
Mean duration of employment 
spells 
     up to 2 years before UEP* 
3.7 3.5 3.3 4.6 4.8 4.8 3.8 
     up to 5 years before UEP* 12.1 12 12.4 14.8 13.2 13 16.5 
     from entry in data to UEP* 48.6 42.0 48.6 47.5 35.7 47.3 41.5 
Mean duration of out-of-labour 
spells 
     up to 2 years before UEP* 
2.20 1.91 1.70 1.70 1.39 1.11 1.62 
     up to 5 years before UEP* 3.61 3.22 2.95 2.94 3.60 3.19 3.86 
     from entry in data to UEP* 7.58 5.64 7.66 9.25 8.82 6.72 6.58 
Total months in all pro-
grammes up to 
     2 years before the UEP* 
0.73 0.52 0.47 0.76 0.70 0.63 0.46 
     5 years before the UE P* 1.32 1.54 1.55 1.53 1.48 0.95 1.54 
     before entry in the sample* 2.07 2.89 2.85 2.73 2.04 1.65 2.58 
Programme information 
Planned programme duration* 
(months) 
 5.95 3.82 9.74 20.43 9.91 5.09 
Table A.1 to be continued 
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Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics (continued-3) 
 Nonpar-
ticipa-
tion 
Practice 
firm 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retraining Career 
improve-
ment 
Other 
Various un/employment information from the "first unemployment period" 
Duration of the "first UE spell"* 7.60 6.55 6.91 6.59 5.56 5.26 4.42 
Duration of last UE spell be-
fore programme* 6.75 5.49 5.57 5.30 4.49 4.25 3.95 
Time since beginning of last 
UE spell (before prog.) even if 
other state between UE and 
prog.* 
6.77 6.60 7.08 6.60 5.61 5.60 4.85 
Time between the prog. and 
last job* 15.0 13.4 13.8 12.3 11.0 9.7 10.8 
time between programme - 
last job ≤ 3 months  16 11 16 17 22 26 20 
 ≤ 6 months  35 37 39 43 43 46 59 
 ≤ 12 months 62 67 67 67 74 75 78 
 ≤ 24 months   84 88 91 90 92 95 92 
Transition in 6 months before 
programme: 
                     UE. → UE 
58 56 61 56 54 44 42 
                  empl. → UE 26 27 27 33 32 39 45 
                      out → UE 14 16 10 10 10 8 11 
                   prog. → UE 2 1 1 1 4 9 3 
Number of prog. in year be-
fore actual progr.* 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.05 
Number of prog.'s in 6 months 
before actual pr.* 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.03 
Firms size of the last employer  
No information 4 4 4 3 3 4 5 
1 to 9 employees 21 21 21 19 18 27 27 
10 to 99 employees 36 36 38 36 35 31 30 
100 to 499 employees 21 25 22 23 23 24 26 
500 employees or more 19 14 15 18 21 15 12 
Timing of programme and appearance in data on average (average month) 
Date of entry in the data*  Oct. 83 Dec. 83 Jun. 83 Aug. 83 May 85 Jul. 84 Apr. 84
Date of UE spell defining treat. 
status* Oct. 93 Aug. 93 Sep. 93 Sep. 93 Sep. 93 Jul. 93 Sep. 93
Date of begin of prog.* Jul. 94 Mar. 94 May 94 May 94 Mar. 94 Jan. 94 Mar. 94
Date of exit from the data* May 00 Dec. 00 Feb. 01 Jan. 01 May 01 Jan. 01 Apr. 01
Outcome+ 
Unemployment in         
Jan. 1990 9559 17.7 21.5 20.4 16.6 15.3 5.9 18.0 
1992 10609 19.1 21.3 17.9 15.5 15.9 9.3 17.4 
1993 10870 24.7 30.8 27.9 21.9 31.5 30.0 27.4 
1994 10960 66.2 77.7 72.9 70.5 74.8 78.2 52.7 
1995 10940 65.1 60.4 64.2 73.6 86.4 60.9 16.2 
1997 10872 37.1 39.9 32.2 30.4 40.8 18.4 14.9 
1999 10670 28.4 30.1 28.5 23.8 24.6 15.6 20.3 
2001 10670 19.2 24.1 21.4 15.7 17.0 10.1 12.2 
Table A.1 to be continued 
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Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics (continued-4) 
 Non-
partici-
pation 
Practice 
firm 
Short 
training 
Long 
training 
Retrain-
ing 
Career 
improve-
ment 
Other
Employment in         
Jan. 1990 9559 69.5 68.0 67.0 71.3 66.9 81.4 70.5 
1992 10609 69.1 67.5 70.0 73.3 68.5 80.6 68.1 
1993 10870 60.9 55.7 60.5 64.7 57.8 62.7 63.0 
1994 10960 24.1 17.2 22.7 22.5 20.3 14.6 41.9 
1995 10940 17.8 28.6 29.9 19.8 9.4 32.7 73.0 
1997 10872 30.1 43.9 49.4 52.6 46.1 60.6 70.3 
1999 10670 33.6 47.4 49.4 51.2 56.8 56.9 59.5 
2001 10670 36.3 47.0 52.8 54.9 60.0 61.5 59.5 
Out-of-Labour in         
Jan. 1990 9559 12.7 10.5 12.7 12.2 17.9 12.8 11.5 
1992 10609 11.8 11.2 11.9 10.9 15.6 10.2 14.5 
1993 10870 14.4 13.6 11.6 13.4 10.7 7.3 9.6 
1994 10960 9.7 5.1 4.4 7.0 4.8 7.3 5.4 
1995 10940 16.9 11.0 5.9 6.7 3.9 6.4 10.8 
1997 10872 32.6 16.2 18.3 17.0 12.9 19.3 14.9 
1999 10670 37.9 22.6 22.1 25.0 18.7 26.6 20.3 
2001 10670 44.6 29.0 25.9 29.3 23.1 28.4 28.4 
Note:  The sample used for the table is the one after all selection steps described in Section 3, but 
before imposing the common support requirement. *The results for variables marked with an 
asterisk are means rather than proportions. **Local unemployment rates for each of the 141 
local labour office districts. +The different outcomes do not add up to 100% because of some 
missing values. ++ The category 'No information' includes both cases with missing earnings in-
formation and with the entry '0'. Zero entries are made for so-called inactive employment which 
includes women on maternity leave, men in the military or civil service, as well as employees 
having been ill for more than six weeks.  The first column gives the number of observations 
used to compute the proportions. The sample size decreases due to different entry dates into 
the sample (first UE spell in 93/94) and exit dates from the sample. Results for subpopulations 
with less than 50 observations are not reported. 
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